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    In the mid-1990s, an initiative was launched to provide special 
debt relief from public creditors to more than forty Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPCs). In 1999, this initiative was further refined and widened 
in what has been hailed as a new approach to development co-operation. 
The indebted country is to produce a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP), which will make clear how it will pursue the twin goals of sustain-
able growth and combating poverty. This is meant to provide guarantees to 
creditors that the budgetary resources freed by debt relief will be used tot 
combat poverty1. Interestingly, the conditions attached by the donor com-
munity for granting debt relief emphasize full country ‘ownership’, by which 
is meant that the PRSP process must be country-led and the result fully 
backed by the government, in contrast to some of the structural adjustment 
programs which where written by economists from the IMF and the World 
Bank and signed without conviction by the recipient government. A related 
feature is that the PRSP must be produced in an open and participatory2 
manner. More specifically, civil society should be consulted and be involved 
in preparing the PRSP. The international donor community has eagerly es-
poused the thesis that civil society organizations (CSOs) can play an impor-
tant role in democracy and development. There is now considerable funding 
for projects to strengthen CSOs in developing countries (Howell & Pearce 
2000: 75). The Poverty Reduction Strategy goes one step further by insisting 
that organized civil society be acknowledged as a partner by government. 
This makes it the most important effort to date, to apply participatory ap-
proaches at the macro level (Tikare et al. 2001:3).  
  From the point of view of the donor community, a lot is expected from 
the participatory approach in the PRSP formulation. « It was hoped that a 
participatory process would contribute to broader country ownership of the 
strategies, facilitate implementation and strengthen governmental account-
ability » (Bank-Fund Staff 2002:11). In general, the assumptions are that 
participation of civil society will enhance institutional performance and 
foster government accountability by giving civil society a role in monitor-
ing policy implementation. Civil society thus is turned into a watchdog of 
government, alongside the media and parliament. Secondly, participation 
will increase ownership of the development strategy, not only by the gov-
ernment, but also by the population, by stimulating reasoned debate, shared 
understanding, and a partial consensus on some of the fundamental strate-
gic choices (Tikare et al. 2001:5; Eurodad 2001; McGee 2001:8). Thirdly, 
participation of CSOs will increase the effectiveness of poverty reducing 
policies, partly as a consequence of increased ownership and accountability, 
but also more directly by involving the poor in identifying the causes of their 
predicament and some of the remedies (e.g. Isham et al. 1995; Schusterman 
& Hardoy 1997). Fourthly, in the long run, the forgoing three factors will 
interact in a virtuous circle, deepening and strengthening both democracy 
and the development process (Howell & Pearce 2000:75; Putnam 1993).  
1 Much useful information 
is available from the PRSP 
website of the World Bank: http:
//poverty.worldbank.org/prsp/
2 The concepts participation and 
consultation are used arbitrarily 
in World Bank documents. Both 
concepts are nevertheless quite 
different. Consultation is not 
binding, hence government can 
choose whether or not certain 
contributions from civil society 
are to be introduced in the final 
document. Participation goes one 
step further in that government 
allows civil society to take part 
in decision-making processes. 
In the Bolivian case, the official 
results of the process were in-
troduced in the final draft of the 
PRSP. We will therefore use the 
concept of participation through-
out the paper, although some of 
the civil society organisations 
(CSOs) we interviewed insisted 
that, because of the limited scope 
of the topics open for participa-
tion, the process could at best be 
called a consultation. 
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  These assumptions have been to a certain extent validated by research 
into the successes and failures of past aid policies. Donor thinking has 
gradually become more sophisticated over the years, reflecting the cumula-
tive insight of large numbers of evaluations and other studies, both by donor 
institutions and by independent researchers. But quite a lot of the thinking 
on the role of civil society and participation is based on Western experi-
ences, where participation and the growth of civil society has been (more or 
less) an endogenous process that evolved over centuries. Third World coun-
tries however now face considerable external pressure (under the form of the 
PRSP guidelines) to increase the role, weight and influence of CSOs. 
  So the fundamental question is: what gains can be expected from 
externally imposed participation. Will civil society be strengthened? Can 
one strengthen civil society as if it were a homogeneous unity? Or is it 
more about strengthening certain parts of civil society? If so, which parts 
are to be strengthened? Can donors “buy” participation?  Is civil society in 
these HIPC countries prepared for its new task as a high-level negotiator? 
Have NGOs and other actors the expertise to interact with government on 
sometimes highly technical matters? Do actors involved in the PRSP have 
a mandate from the rest of the not-for-profit civil society to speak on their 
behalf?  Can urban-based highly educated NGO officials represent the poor, 
especially in ethnically and culturally highly fragmented societies? Even if 
civil society is representative and up to its task, is the government serious 
in seeking its involvement? Will government propose genuine participation, 
rather than try to placate the donors with a semblance of the real thing? Even 
if the answers up to this point are all in the positive, do we have guarantees 
that such participation will be instrumental in achieving other developmen-
tal goals? More specifically, will participation bring about more account-
ability, ownership, and effectiveness? In addition, will it do so in ways that 
are institutionally robust? How does such civil society participation in fact 
square with the political process? Will fragile democracies not be under-
mined when unelected civil society actors perform some of the basic func-
tions of parliament, and will this not jeopardize the sought after long-term 
effects of more accountable and representative government? Obviously, the 
range and scope of these questions is quite formidable, and the aim of our 
paper is more modest than to try to answer them all. Yet donors, led by the 
World Bank, act as if they have the answers. In the case of Bolivia in par-
ticular, weak points are being acknowledged and lip service is being paid to 
the difficulty of securing genuine participation, but the overriding message 
is that the participatory dimension of PRSP process in Bolivia has been quite 
successful, and that other countries can learn from it, if not by imitation, 
then at least by adaptation3. 
  We have serious misgivings about the optimistic assertions that civil 
society participation will trigger off better political performance and more 
accountability, more ownership, and increased effectiveness. In this paper, 
we set out our doubts. We do not question that intensive participation is a 
sign of a mature developed society, nor that it constitutes a desirable goal 
3 In this paper we focus on the 
Bolivian case. The broader 
research project we are working 
on is a comparative research in 
which the Bolivian experience 
will be compared with Nicara-
gua and Rwanda. Bolivia was 
one of the first countries to go 
through the PRSP-process. The 4 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 • 5
by itself and that it puts pressure on governments to perform better, and 
therefore in the long run is desirable for the HIPC countries now drawing up 
PRSPs, but we do have qualms about the way proposed to get to that remote 
point. Our contention is that participation as imposed by donors, is at the 
same time too ambitious to be workable and too vague to be monitored. We 
argue that the participation conditionality should be ‘contextualized’ in the 
sense of being molded to the specific history and institutional context of 
every country. We use Bolivia, generally regarded as an example of suc-
cessful civil society participation in the PRSP, to make our point. Through 
describing the participation process and analyzing its weaknesses and prob-
lems we will see that the vagueness of donors gave the Bolivian government 
the freedom of organizing the process in a way that neutralized the poten-
tially revolutionary sting of civil society involvement. Bolivian government 
was given a free hand to manipulate the process and to render it harmless 
to itself. Admittedly, some genuine participation took place, but not by the 
poorest, and it was circumscribed to a small part of the PRSP that not only 
did not threaten the central government but in fact turned the heat away 
from its own considerable failings. A preliminary conclusion suggested by 
our reading of the Bolivian case is that the participatory PRSP process does 
not fundamentally alter the relations between government and civil society, 
but that it reproduces the already existing strengths and weaknesses, and at 
best, adds some positive gradual changes. Public sector accountability was 
strengthened, but not in ways that allowed to tackle the major failings of the 
present political system. As far as listening to civil society is concerned, 
the donor community restricted its attention very strictly to the PRSP and 
turned a blind eye to several incidents where the government dealt ruthlessly 
with civil society protests that questioned and challenged its development 
strategy. We refer in particular to government plans to privatize certain pub-
lic service utilities and to eradicate coca production. 
We further doubt that there has been an increase in “ownership” as a result 
of civil society participation in the Bolivian PRSP process. Bolivia remains 
as divided as ever on the development strategy followed with considerable 
donor approval since 1985. If put to the test of a referendum, the majority of 
the voters might well reject those policies, including those embedded in the 
PRSP. 
We are also not convinced that the participation that took place increased the 
effectiveness of poverty alleviation policies. We argue that local participa-
tion had an impact on the effectiveness of the PRSP, but that its influence 
was circumscribed to a small part of the total budget. Moreover, even for 
this small part, it is not so clear that participation will, on most counts, lead 
to a more effective poverty reduction strategy. Participation is not necessar-
ily good for combating poverty. There may be cases where there is too much 
participation for effectiveness sake. We argue that there have been several 
such occurrences in Bolivia 
  As far as the lessons for other countries are concerned, if relatively 
little progress has been achieved in a country with a fairly open political op-
portunity structure, and a far better organized and vocal civil society than in 
accumulated experience at the 
level of actors, the insights of and 
analyses made by the WB-staff 
might highlight in retrospect 
important aspects of the partici-
pation process. Bolivia is, com-
pared to Nicaragua and Rwanda, 
situated at the ‘good track record’ 
continuum. Studying the Boliv-
ian case is therefore instrumental 
as is will help us calibrate the 
scale on which PRSP ought to be 
judged. Contrasting Nicaragua 
and Rwanda with Bolivia should 
be more realistic than placing 
them in front of an ideal (the the-
oretical assumptions mentioned 
before) that might be unrealistic 
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most of the other countries where the PRSP process is being tried, much of 
the optimism surrounding the participatory nature of PRSP is unwarranted. 
It would be far better for donors to get away from their unrealistic and vague 
participation conditionality and to replace it by country-specific and realistic 
targets. 
  This paper is based on extensive literature study, secondary data and 
information gathered during interviews with governmental and non-gov-
ernmental actors that were involved in the PRSP participation process in 
Bolivia (a complete list with interviewed actors is attached in annex). 6 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 • 7
  2.   The Bolivian Case 
    Bolivia has an average income per head of around US$ 1000 
and glaring regional and ethnic (white and mestizo versus Indian) inequal-
ity. Social indicators are much closer to those of African countries than to 
the rest of Latin America. Two thirds of the population is living below the 
national poverty line, and child mortality in the poorest regions is among the 
highest in the world. In 1985, a few years after the restoration of democracy, 
the country embarked on a sweeping economic reform program with the 
help of the IMF and the World Bank (Morales & Sachs 1990). Since then, 
the country has been a model pupil of the Bretton Woods Institutions, and 
has received vast amounts of development aid from multilateral and bilateral 
sources4. It has sound macroeconomic policies and has enacted bold liberal 
reforms, involving among others the privatization of mining and bank-
ing industries. It has however not witnessed the high rates of growth of for 
instance its neighbor Chile or the Asian economies whose macroeconomic 
policies it has successfully emulated (Kaufmann et al; 2001). In the 1990s, a 
moderate annual growth of GNP of 4% was registered, but much of that was 
offset by a rapidly expanding population and since the end of the 1990s, the 
country is in economic crisis (Banco Central 2002). In fact, over the whole 
period 1985-2001 Bolivia has achieved an insignificant per capita income 
growth rate of less than 1% a year (World Bank 2002b), vastly insufficient 
to lift Bolivians out of poverty within an acceptable time horizon. To make 
matters worse a disproportionate part of growth was concentrated in the 
richer areas of the country (the axis La Paz –Cochabamba – Santa Cruz) and 
in capital-intensive hydrocarbon and mineral industries. Bolivia is, together 
with Guyana, the only country in South America on the World Bank list of 
highly indebted poor countries (HIPC). This means that its external debt, 
mainly owed to multilateral and bilateral public creditors, is judged unsus-
tainably high (World Bank Staff 2002).
 
  Access to the HIPC resources after the expansion of the initiative in 
1999 (henceforward called HIPC II) is linked to the country organizing a 
civil society participation process. To be sure, participation is not as strict a 
condition as for instance sound macroeconomic policies. There is a strong 
suggestion that some participation be organized. World Bank and IMF staffs 
do not however have precise criteria by which to judge success in this area 
and they mainly want to be satisfied that the country has done a genuine ef-
fort to involve civil society. In Bolivia, the government organized a National 
Dialogue – sometimes referred to as Dialogue 2000 or Dialogue 2- with 
respect to the PRSP. This Dialogue was a country-led, nationwide consulta-
tion process that was initiated in June 2000 and ended three months later in 
August 2000. In total 2,423 people participated in the Dialogue (273 at the 
national level, 935 at the departmental level and 1,215 at the municipal level) 
(Christian Aid 2001:5). The consultation process was conducted through 
municipal, departmental and national government structures, making use 
of the institutional framework the Law of Popular Participation (Ley de la 
Participación Popular) provides since 1994. Greatest emphasis was placed 
4 Foreign aid stood at a massive 
two thirds of central govern-
ment expenditures during the 
second half of the 1980s, one 
half during the first half of the 
1990s, and one-third during the 
second half of the 1990s (World 
Bank 2002b). International aid 
flows have sharply dropped in 
importance since the beginning 
of macroeconomic reform, but 
donor influence has not waned 
in the same proportion.  In fact 
donors have in recent years 
increased their pressure on the 
Government through high level 
consultations in the context of 
the Comprehensive Development 
Framework (Carafa 2000)8 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 • 9
on municipal round tables where social issues were discussed. More impor-
tantly, these discussions focused on how the HIPC II resources would be 
allocated so as to have the largest possible impact on poverty. Most observ-
ers seem to agree that Bolivia organized quite an impressive participatory 
process. 
  2.1.  Organization of the Participation Process
    The potential impact of a nationwide participation process is 
largely determined by the organizational format or the institutional design 
of the process itself. The way in which such a process is organized there-
fore -- in scope, in depth, who is to be consulted and the extent to which 
the government is tied by the end result of such a process -- is an important 
issue that can lead to profound disagreement and conflict. This is exactly 
what happened in Bolivia. Fierce discussions and sudden changes in govern-
mental strategy preceded the final format of the National Dialogue 2. Before 
making a critical analysis, we will give a short chronology of the participa-
tory process and how it was set up.
  When the word got out that a nationwide consultation was going to 
take place, many civil society actors immediately and pro-actively tried to 
influence the preparatory process. An independent group of professionals 
had several contacts with Vice-President Jorge Quiroga to discuss poverty 
reducing strategies and organizational matters of the Dialogue. The Church 
and several social organizations expressed in an open letter to the govern-
ment their concerns about the intentions of the government, while making 
propositions on the organizational aspects of the process and announcing 
their own nationwide consultation process called Jubilee 2000. Govern-
ment contacted networks of non-governmental development organizations 
(NGOs) on the organizational aspects of the process and the latter prepared 
a document on the minimum conditions to be satisfied for participation not 
to turn into a mere formality. A group of associations of small entrepreneurs 
from the informal sector, distrustful about the intentions of the government, 
decided to found their own Federation – Comité de Enlace – and organize 
their own National Consultation (Consulta Nacional), which was intended to 
feed into the National Dialogue. 
  At first, the government and the Technical Secretariat of independent 
consultants that was entrusted the task of organizing the consultation pro-
cess, opted to do so along functional lines, mainly involving nationally or-
ganized NGOs, movements and institutions. This format had also been used 
during the National Dialogue 1 in 1997, organized by the government of 
President Banzer at the beginning of its term in office5. Many CSOs however 
were very dissatisfied with the way the Banzer administration had selected 
the participants (without consultation), the brevity of the consultation (three 
days) and the unwillingness of government of having in-depth discussions 
on development strategies. 
5 Banzer who had ruled Bolivia 
as a military dictator during the 
1970s was elected with only 23% 
of the votes. Setting up a consul-
tation process involving national 
CSOs and social movements 
may well have been inspired by a 
desire to increase the legitimacy 
of his administration.  8 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 • 9
The Technical Secretariat subsequently decided to design a process along 
territorial rather than functional and sectoral lines (World Bank 2002a:7).
Using the institutional framework of the Law of Popular Participation (1994) 
and the Decentralization Law (1995), the local municipalities would become 
the main actors in the participatory process6. These revised proposals with 
their focus on consultations at the municipal level were presented to the 
donors by the end of January 2000. No direct reference was made to the 
nationally organized CSOs. Informally however, meetings were held with 
these functional CSOs and donors created a Special Fund to support the 
contributions these CSOs would make through their own consultation proc-
esses, which in the end would be brought into the National Dialogue. 
  In the meanwhile, from December 1999 to August 2000 CSO proc-
esses bloomed across Bolivia, in preparation of the National Dialogue or 
parallel to it. The Special Fund financed not less than 14 processes involving 
an estimate of 10,000 people, and international NGOs contributed money for 
the preparation of critical documents7. The government on its part continu-
ously postponed the official launch of the Dialogue, due to social unrest and 
political crises. There was for instance quite some confusion around the 
results of the municipal elections that had just taken place and the effect this 
might have on the constitution of the municipal round tables. In March 2000 
protests broke out in Cochabamba around the privatization and ensuing dra-
matic price increases of water, and this triggered a series of protests all over 
the country. The government responded with military force and declared a 
national state of emergency. The sometimes violent clashes however contin-
ued and resulted in five deaths. The use of violence was heavily criticized 
and led to even more uprisings. At that point, the coordinator of the Techni-
cal Secretariat, appointed to organize the National Dialogue, resigned be-
cause of the way the government was handling the crisis. Finally, the Banzer 
government relented and gave in to many of the demands of the protesters. 
Under the pressure of the Church, the trade unions and the donor commu-
nity, which threatened to withhold HIPC debt relief, the state of emergency 
was lifted and the National Dialogue finally started. 
  At its official launch, in May 2000, the government explained the 
final design of the Dialogue. It would consist of three separate dialogues: a 
social, an economic and a political agenda. These three agendas would come 
together in a final national round table. Each agenda would invite different 
stakeholders. The Social Agenda - which is of major concern for our paper 
- would be discussed through municipal and departmental round tables, fol-
lowing the existing decentralized political structures that the Law of Popular 
Participation and the Decentralization Law had called into life in 1994 and 
1995. The economic agenda would be discussed with large entrepreneurs, 
the political agenda mainly with political parties and government officials.
6 The Law of Popular Participa-
tion and the Decentralization law 
granted far stretching autonomy 
to the level of municipalities. The 
explicit goals of the laws was to 
create a more just distribution 
and better administration of 
public resources, to promote eco-
nomic growth and development 
especially in the rural areas, and 
to advance political participation 
in general and the participation 
of local organizations in deci-
sion-making processes in partic-
ular (Ejdesgaard Jeppesen 2002 :
31). In no other country had the 
state gone so far in recogniz-
ing local organizations, giving 
them a place and role within the 
political structures. The local 
organizations that are subject of 
the LPP are the peasant’ commu-
nities and the indigenous peoples 
who are mainly located in the 
rural areas, and the neighborhood 
committees that are situated in 
the urban areas. These were all 
recognized as OTBs (Organisa-
ciones Territoriales de Base). The 
link between the local executive 
council and the OTBs is the 
Vigilance Committee (Comité 
de Vigilancia). This committee 
consists of representatives of 
the OTBs and its specific goal is 
to function as an advisory and 
control organism to watch over 
the activities of the Mayor and 
his Council.
7 Due to space limitations this 
paper will not give account of the 
numerous initiatives undertaken 
by CSO alongside the National 
Dialogue. Instead, we focus on 
the National Dialogue and the 
interaction with these parallel 
initiatives.10 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 • 11
  The Municipal Round Tables
  Before the round tables took place, the municipalities received a ques-
tionnaire. In this questionnaire four topics were handled: identification of the 
poor and how to address their poverty, identification of institutions which 
should handle HIPC resources and criteria for allocation, identification of 
institutional mechanisms to control and evaluate the use of resources and 
type of civil society involved in it, desirability of institutionalization of the 
Dialogue 2 and ways to implement it. 
  The round tables were held over two days in each of the capitals of 
the nine departments in Bolivia. The following people were to represent the 
municipality: the Mayor (representing the local government), the Vice-Presi-
dent from the Municipal Council (representing the local opposition), the 
President of the Vigilance Committee (VC) (representing civil society) and a 
female member of the VC (representing women). On some occasions repre-
sentatives of Jubilee 2000 (Church), the National Consultation (Comité de 
Enlace) and other CSOs were given permission to observe the round tables. 
All municipalities concurred in that they all wanted to implement the strat-
egy themselves, seven out of nine tables wanted resources to be allocated on 
the basis of poverty indicators, six out of nine tables wanted a national and 
departmental institution to control and evaluate the use of resources (with 
the Church participating in both), all agreed that the dialogue should be 
carried out periodically. Each municipal round table elected representatives 
from amongst those attending, to go on to the departmental round tables. Of 
the 130 elected, 65 were from government, 65 from civil society (Vigilance 
Committees).
  The Departmental Tables
  The departmental tables, taking each two days, were open to a wider 
range of participants. Not only the representatives of the municipal round 
tables participated, but also representatives coming from Jubilee 2000, the 
National Consultation, labor unions, federations, NGOs, universities, nation-
al and departmental CSOs, representatives of the Departmental Councils, 
the Central Government, Congress and Prefectural representatives. While 
Jubilee 2000 and the National Consultation presented their own results, the 
departmental tables reached a near consensus8 about the need to install an 
institution to control, monitor and evaluate the use of the resources, and a 
full consensus that the Church should play an important role in such a moni-
toring mechanism and that the Dialogue should be institutionalized. The 
departmental tables appointed representatives to go to the national table.
  The National Table 
  The national table (August 28 – September 2, 2000) was divided into 
two segments. The first half was dedicated to the outcome of the social agen-
da, the second half to the economic agenda. The concrete results regarding 
8 Only one department did not 
agree with the idea that the use 
of the resources should be moni-
tored and evaluated by a separate 
institution at the national and 
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the social agenda were that 70% of the HIPC II resources were to be distrib-
uted on the basis of poverty indicators, while 30% of the resources would 
be distributed equally among the nine departments, and further down to the 
municipalities. Secondly, a consensus was reached on mechanisms for the 
distribution of the resources: the municipal governments should be responsi-
ble for the administration of the funds. Thirdly, the stakeholders agreed that 
civil society should have the opportunity to control, monitor and evaluate 
the use of the resources. This was translated into a  “mechanism of social 
control” in which the Church would play a major role. Finally, it was agreed 
that the National Dialogue would take place every three years.
  The economic agenda did not arrive at a national agreement due to 
large disagreements amongst the representatives of the private sector. The 
political agenda centered around three broad topics: democracy, participa-
tion and transparency, but never made it to the national round table, as it 
remained stuck in preparatory seminars. In these seminars representatives of 
Jubilee, the Consulta National, political parties and government participated. 
No agreement was reached because the proposals presented by civil society -   
for example the direct election of independent candidates - were a source of 
profound disagreement with and amongst political parties and government 
representatives. 
  2.2.   The results: strengths and potential weaknesses 
    All in all, the National Dialogue has been an important process. 
Although the economic and the political tables did not produce any national 
agreements, important results came out of the participatory process in the 
social agenda. 
  Two concrete institutional arrangements resulted from the Dialogue. 
The first one is the Law of National Dialogue (Ley del Dialogo Nacional). 
The law stipulates that the consultation exercise as implemented for getting 
access to the HIPC II resources is to be repeated every three years. The goal 
is to involve the municipalities in the further implementation, the monitoring 
and the evaluation of the PRSP. The second concrete result is the agreement 
to install a National Mechanism of Social Control (Mecanismo National de 
Control Social), which consists of nine Departmental Mechanisms of Social 
Control. These institutions consist of civil society actors and they will super-
vise the local and the national level on the use of the HIPC II resources. The 
Church will play a coordinating role in this mechanism. 
  These direct results are important because they stipulate on paper 
that from now on municipalities will gain more influence regarding pro-
poor development policies and more resources to combat poverty. At the 
same time, municipalities will get direct access to the HIPC II resources. 
For some municipalities this implies a doubling or more of their resources. 
These resources have to be exclusively destined to combating poverty at the 12 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 • 13
local level. Regarding the role of civil society as a watchdog of government, 
the passing of the Law on the National Dialogue that foresees an institution 
called National Mechanism of Social Control is an important step forward, 
although it is too early to know how this institution will finally function.
  Admittedly, the additional decentralization resulting from the Na-
tional Dialogue has several advantages over the previous Law of Popular 
Participation: the allocation of resources favors the poorer municipalities, 
additional social control mechanisms are put into place, and it is has been 
accepted that political parties lose their political monopoly in fielding candi-
dates9. Nevertheless it remains to be seen whether the serious weaknesses of 
the previous reforms will be avoided.
  The National Dialogue has also had a few indirect results. Important 
to mention is that the participation process induced a further institutionali-
zation of the Law of Popular Participation. This is important and positive 
because it strengthens local level actors in their capacity to contribute to 
the formulation of development policies, while their opportunity to reduce 
poverty at the municipal level is substantially increased. Regarding civil 
society, the organization of processes in preparation or alongside the Dia-
logue showed that quite some Bolivian CSOs have the capacity, strength and 
credibility to organize complex and nationwide consultation processes in a 
large country with geographically widespread populations. CSOs themselves 
admit that the Dialogue, directly and indirectly, has induced a transfor-
mation process, which turned their attitude from “Protesta” (protest) into 
“Propuesta” (proposal). The antagonistic style which historically marked 
the activities of large sectors within civil society –as in the rest of in Latin 
America -- was at least partly turned around thanks to the interventions of 
donors (interviews Juan Carlos Nuñez; Hugo Fernandez; Vladimir Sanchez; 
World Bank 2002:12). The Special Fund that financed these processes has 
thus been crucial in helping certain civil society organizations contribute 
constructively instead of focusing exclusively on protest. Furthermore, the 
Dialogue has created an opportunity for large CSOs to work together and to 
create alliances. Probably the best example is the founding of the ‘Comité 
de Enlace’ (Interview Coco Pinelo; Hugo Fernandez; Juan Carlos Nuñez), 
which united small and medium producers and artisan organizations into 
a federation. They successfully influenced the National Dialogue through 
lobbying. The one other institution that has come strengthened out of this 
process is the Catholic Church10. It succeeded in becoming the main actor 
in the institutionalization of the Mechanism of Social Control (World Bank 
2002:18).     
 
  These new institutional arrangements however have to be set against 
the background of Latin American politics in general and Bolivian politics 
in particular. 
  Latin American politics are heavily characterized by clientelism and 
patronage: unofficialdom, the dominance of informal rules, a bureaucracy 
9 This latter measure however 
requires a constitutional reform. 
During the negotiations lead-
ing up to the formation of the 
new government that is to take 
office in August 2002 the main 
contending parties agreed that 
the constitution would indeed be 
reviewed to this effect.
10 The Catholic Church will call 
for and promote full participation 
and will give permanent assist-
ance to the National Mechanism 
of Social Control (art. 29, Law 
National Dialogue).  The fact 
that the Church has gained an 
important position regarding 
the institutionalization of the 
mechanism of social control is 
not seen as entirely positive. 
Certain CSOs prefer to maintain 
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being dominated by political criteria instead of merit, the weakness of insti-
tutions and formal rules. These features form the most serious obstacles to 
political performance, and the most pertinent causes of corruption. Political 
parties play an important role, because they form the vehicle to capture and 
circulate state patronage among the middle classes. Bolivia stands out as an 
extreme case (Kaufmann et al. 2001). On the other hand, Bolivia has a very 
high score on civil liberties (Freedom House 2002; Kaufmann et al. 2001:31) 
that partially explains the quite active attitude of civil society. Bolivia is thus 
characterized by low government effectiveness, low control of corruption 
and low rule of law, yet an open opportunity structure and an active organ-
ized civil society. What can this tell us about the functioning of the new 
institutional arrangements? Some scholars argue that as far as Latin Ameri-
can politics are concerned, a new set of rules and institutional arrangements 
does not necessarily alter the configuration of power relations. Neither does 
it alter the modes in which actors interpret rules, negotiate around them and 
apply them as a functions of power resources which are distributed unequal-
ly (Vilas 1997:11). If a system functions predominantly on clientelism and 
patronage, this is a vicious circle that is difficult to break (Putnam 1993).
  In short, an appreciation of the nature of the political game in Bolivia 
should caution us against assuming that new institutional arrangements will 
automatically change the political mechanisms that are the root cause of 
problematic political performance. The past also indicates the stubbornness 
of certain mechanisms. The institutional arrangement that was proposed 
by the Law of Popular Participation in 1994 did not fundamentally change 
the nature of the political game in Bolivia. Recent literature (Ejdesgaard 
Jeppesen 2002) argues that it did not alter the relations between rich and 
poor, urban and rural, mestizo and indigenous, and secondly, the all perva-
sive power of the political parties was not counterbalanced by the control 
function the Vigilance Committee is entitled to exercise, but rather penetrat-
ed it. The general assessment the CSOs make related to the local structures 
is that the civil society organizations at the municipal level – the so-called 
Territorial Basis Organizations (Organisaciones Territoriales de Base) - and 
the Vigilance Committee have been co-opted into the system and spoiled by 
political party benefits and promises. According to Ivan Arias who was at 
the time of our research vice-minister of Popular Participation, about 80% 
of the presidents of the VCs are members of political parties (interview Ivan 
Arias).  In this sense, according to Medeiros (2001:413), the state succeeded 
in enlarging the sphere of its hegemonic control through shrinking its 
responsibilities and enlarging civil society participation. The state ‘created’ 
civil society by recognizing al sorts of organizations as OTBs and securing 
representation in the Vigilance Committee, yet at the same time the state 
could, through party politics, control the functioning of these newly created 
institutions. Turning back to the PRSP, chances are that the meddling over 
the HIPC II resources at the local level will be heavily influenced by party 
politics rather than genuine concern for the voiceless and poor constituents. 
To therefore argue that the involvement of the opposition in the National 
Dialogue (through the presence of the Vice-President of the municipal coun-
wish to form an alliance with a 
religious institution. Some regard 
the Church as too conservative, 
too paternalist, others believe 
that the Church stands too close 
to the State to be credible. From a 
pluralistic point of view it doesn’t 
seem healthy to give the Church 
such an important weight in a 
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cil in the municipal round tables) contributes to the continuity of the PRSP 
across different governmental coalitions, may well be a naïve interpretation 
of Bolivian reality. 
  Regarding the strengthening of civil society, a general criticism is in 
order. The strengthening of civil society organizations -- supporting them 
financially, motivating them to monitor government and make construc-
tive contributions -- should not go at the expense of the institution that in 
a democracy is supposed to perform these functions, namely parliament. 
Most PRSP participation processes treat parliament very casually, almost 
dismissively (Eberlei 2001: 12; Eurodad 2000, 2001), as if its core function 
of controlling the government could just as well be taken over by un-elected 
civil society organizations. Parliament should control, discuss, debate, reject 
or approve. That is the nature of the political game. Crucially, parliament 
can be held accountable by the public. Members of parliament that do not 
do their job well can loose their mandate. Civil society organizations on the 
other hand do not run that risk: they are not held accountable; they do not 
risk their jobs and future. It thus seems quite unhealthy to deposit such a 
large part of the control function of the poverty reduction strategy solely in 
the hands of private organizations. 
  An additional advantage of parliament is related to the fact that it con-
stitutes an indirect form of representation. This allows the government to get 
approval from parliament for technically complex decisions, such as those 
relating to macroeconomic reform that may not carry the immediate approv-
al of the general population. At the next parliamentary elections, when some 
of the results of the decisions have become manifest, the population is in a 
better position to judge whether such decisions were well founded or not.  
It could be argued that this is what happened in Bolivia, where since 1985 
four successive democratically elected governments have each obtained the 
approval of parliament for unpopular but necessary reforms imposed by the 
donor community. It is unlikely that any of them would have succeeded if it 
had to get approval from the population through a process of participation 
of CSOs. The Bolivian parliament has not been much involved in the PRSP. 
The PRSP was itself not submitted to a parliamentary vote, although some 
features regarding its implementation were approved by law. The opposition 
parties were invited to participate in the political dialogue, but the underly-
ing consensus model did not fit well with the political tradition in Bolivia, 
where opposition parties essentially oppose anything that comes from the 
government and wait their turn at the next elections to govern. 
  Added to that, Bolivia, like many developing countries, does not have 
a very effective legal and administrative framework to control, monitor, 
audit or sanction NGOs and other CSOs. The law of the jungle pretty much 
rules the space of civil society organizations, and there are few rules or lim-
its to what they are allowed to do. Bolivian government officials complained 
to us during interviews that donors quite unselectively supported all kinds of 
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a destabilizing effect on the economy and society. For instance, they attrib-
uted some of the disturbances that occurred during the year of the National 
Dialogue to the uncritical support by donors, and warned that donors were 
in this way undermining the political stability of the country. The critique 
raises interesting challenges for donors: what kind of legal civil society 
framework should they support in developing countries? What kind of civil 
society organizations should be strengthened? In addition, how should the 
institutional task divisions be arranged so as to avoid overlap and institu-
tional weakening of legislative organs? 
  Perfectly comprehensible reasons may be advanced on why parlia-
ment is being bypassed. On Bolivian soil, two arguments were put forward. 
First, parliament has a bad reputation. Bolivian actors (both governmental 
and non-governmental) stated in interviews that parliament is not perceived 
by most Bolivians as a representative body, that Bolivians do not trust it. 
The Latinobarometro11 effectively shows that only 16% of the Bolivians 
trust parliament12. But that cannot be a good argument to ignore parliament, 
as civil society can never replace it in the task of controlling the executive 
branch of government. A second argument is that parliamentary involve-
ment in the PRSP might not actually promote the interests of the poor (ODI 
2000: 17). It is said that parliament is corrupt, that members of parliament 
are only motivated by personal and material self-interest, that the politi-
cal party to which they belong has a greater influence over them than their 
constituencies. Even without questioning the validity of these claims, one 
may ask whether it is not likely that similar problems will occur outside the 
political sphere? The Latinobarometro shows that in 2000, only 18% of the 
Bolivians expressed trust in their fellow citizens, and general trust scores hit 
an all time low. The data indicate a deep legitimacy crisis in which political 
institutions have lost credibility. Measurements in 2000 showed that only 
22% is satisfied with the functioning of democracy (Latinobarometro 2000). 
This raises the question to what extent Bolivian citizens trust umbrella-like 
civil society organizations, or social movements or grass-root movements to 
negotiate on their behalf the PRSP or monitor its implementation? In other 
words, to what extent do civil society organizations effectively voice what 
lives in society? Are the organizations ‘representing’ in one way or the other 
‘the people’. Data collected in Bolivia show that 60% of the population is not 
at all involved in associational life. Of the citizens that do participate not less 
than 25.6% is member of a religious organization. The second most suc-
cessful organization are sport clubs (17.9%) and labor unions (11.9%)13. The 
Church is thus not only an institution that draws quite significant numbers of 
people to its organizations, but furthermore it is also highly valued, trusted 
and credible. About 82% of Bolivians express trust in the Catholic Church. 
Therefore, granting the Church an important role in the installation of the 
National Mechanism of Social Control seems logical and might induce the 
sentiment that the implementation of the PRSP and the control over HIPC 
II resources will be effectively carried out. In our view the installation of 
such a control mechanism should not replace or absolve the responsibility 
of parliament, and these mechanisms should not function as roundabout 
11 See: www.latinobarometro.org
12 Bolivians tend to place more 
trust in the armed forces as 29% 
expressed trust in the military. 
In Latin America in general, 
it seems that about 30% of the 
citizens trust the President, 34% 
trusts the judicial system and 
only 19% trusts the political 
parties.
13 These data were collected in 
2001 by “Variables y Tendencias 
SRL, Consultores Asociados” 
in co-operation with Caritas 
Bolivia. We express our profound 
gratitude to Juan Carlos Nuñez 
who granted us permission to use 
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ways to tackle political problems. If donors think that political governance 
issues are so crucial to development in general and the effective use of aid 
resources in particular that some conditionality is justified, they should face 
the issue squarely and address the problem of corruption and badly function-
ing democratic institutions. 
  2.3.  Forging a change but taking the sting out 
    Although the Bolivian participatory process falls nothing short 
of an impressive exercise – an exercise most Western countries have never 
undertaken - the results are heavily marked by the fact that it was externally 
imposed on a government that at the same time had all the leeway to organ-
ize it the way it saw fit. We argue that the government succeeded in taking 
the sting out in two ways: by de-politicizing the topics open for discussion, 
and by politicizing the selection of the participants.
  From the outset, the structure of the Dialogue and the questionnaire 
upon which the social agenda discussions were based, heavily constrained 
the scope for institutional change. The four topics dealt with in the question-
naire and in the Dialogue were often put in the form of yes/no questions and 
the responses the municipalities would give were quite predictable: of course 
the municipalities thought the local level the best place to combat poverty, of 
course the municipalities choose to receive the HIPC II resources directly, 
of course they did agree that the use of the resources should be monitored, 
and obviously the Dialogue should be repeated every once in a while. It thus 
seems that the results coming from the social agenda were largely predict-
able to the government that had been pulling the strings. 
  Furthermore, the structure of the Dialogue has been criticized be-
cause the organizational weight of the participatory process was mainly at 
the local level and on the social agenda. According to quite some CSOs 
representatives this deliberately limited the potential role of CSOs to make 
substantive contributions to the PRSP in the short run, and to a politico-
structural change in the long run. 
  Limiting significant participation to a social agenda – how are we 
going to combat poverty with extra money coming in? – reduces poverty to 
a social issue disconnecting it from the economic and political structures 
with which it is inherently related. The social emphasis implies that poverty 
reduction is largely based on a social welfare/basic needs model (GTZ 2002:
3-4). The existence of three separate tables, in spite the obvious links and 
overlaps between issues, was therefore criticized by most CSOs, because 
poverty should be analyzed and tackled in all its dimensions, including the 
structural aspects related to the economic and political system. As such, 
land tenancy and the legal problems related to property and access to land 
were not discussed, although most of the social conflicts in Bolivia are con-
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consideration was given to asset redistribution. In other words, civil society 
could not touch upon structural issues that produce and reproduce inequal-
ity and poverty because the social agenda did not allow it. The agendas 
where structural issues could be discussed (the economic and the political 
agenda) were open to only limited civil society participation and were by 
their nature unlikely to yield clear agreements, implying that no immediate 
changes would endanger the existing status quo. During interviews several 
CSO representatives claimed that the government had failed to act upon the 
demands of civil society regarding political and economic reforms; that the 
participation process was a hoax, a political maneuver to make the donors 
happy; that the process was not open for discussing the poverty reduction 
strategy in its totality; that the underlying macro-economic policies were not 
touched upon. The sting was thus taken out of the participation process by 
confining participation to a limited range of topics that were social in nature 
and service-oriented in scope. 
  Following its choice to emphasize the local level, the Technical Sec-
retariat and government decided to organize participation using the institu-
tional framework of the Law of Popular Participation. As explained before, 
the Mayor, the Vice-President of the Council, the President of the Vigilance 
Committee and a woman would be participating in the round tables. The 
fact that at least half of listed players were elected officials holding a politi-
cal mandate is a somewhat odd interpretation of civil society participation 
and representation. Civil society organizations correctly argued that this 
process was more about central government consulting local government, 
than central government consulting civil society. The more specialized 
intermediate NGOs were thus as a result bypassed, which was very much to 
the convenience of the Bolivian state, because these highly professionalized 
NGOs are generally perceived by the state as oppositional and antagonistic. 
Conversely, the Church is often perceived by other members of civil society 
as being closely aligned with the state14 (Christian Aid 2001:3). Bypassing 
the intermediate actors is, to a large extent, silencing critical voices and thus 
taking the sting out.
  Such conflicting views on whether civil society was involved or not, 
point to different interpretations on what civil society is and who may act on 
its behalf. Since the participation process is about poverty-reducing policies, 
a fundamental question was: who is entitled to speak on behalf of the poor? 
When we look at the PRSP sourcebook published by the World Bank15, a 
very open and inclusive listing of stakeholders is presented. The following 
actors are referred to: government departments other than the ones in charge 
of developing the PRSP, local governments, parliament and other repre-
sentative bodies, the public (including the poor), organized civil society, the 
private-for-profit sector, and external partners (i.e. donors). In other words, 
the definition of civil society as used by the World Bank is quite broad, and 
it recognizes the heterogeneity of civil society. But, does it suffice to just 
list all possible actors as potential participants in the PRSP process? Is it not 
too bland an approach to want to co-opt and support a differentiated ‘civil 
14 The ties between government 
and civil society are as varied as 
the groups themselves. Bolivia 
has a relatively numerous, di-
verse and forceful civil society. 
Deep social cleavages, inequality 
and the struggle against dictator-
ship have given rise to vibrant so-
cial movements and large popular 
protests. A quite large trade un-
ion movement mainly bolstered 
Bolivian social movements. Due 
to the structural adjustment plans 
however, most of the unions 
(peasants and workers) have been 
left decimated and internally 
divided. Although their capac-
ity to mobilize people into the 
streets still is very impressive, 
the internal conflicts impair them 
to effectively co-ordinate and 
pursue common agendas in order 
to influence politics. Quite dif-
ferent are the large intermediate 
NGOs. Some of these organiza-
tions mainly work in advocacy 
and lobbying. Others are federa-
tions, representing the interests 
of member-organizations. These 
organizations often count with a 
staff that is highly educated, very 
professional and with impressive 
technocratic skills.
15 see the website of the World 
Bank where this sourcebook is 
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society’ in all its components? The sourcebook does not propose guidelines 
for distinguishing relevant from less- or non-relevant actors. However, given 
the aim of the PRSP, special attention and weight should be given to those 
groups that represent the poor and/or those institutions that are specialized 
in assessing poverty. In the same vein, it might be justified to neutralize 
the potentially negative impact of those groups in civil society that might 
jeopardize the pro-poor outcome. Civil society is just as much characterized 
by power differences and tensions as any other dimension in society (Howell 
2000:9), which suggests that special attention be given to the more vulner-
able groups who are the intended beneficiaries of the new policies. The big 
absentees in the Bolivian participatory process however, were the vulnerable 
groups: urban and rural poor, indigenous groups, and women (Painter 2002; 
interview Juan Carlos Nuñez). Limited attention was given to ethnic groups 
and gender aspects in the National Dialogue. Quite striking is the fact that 
the questionnaires were not made available in indigenous languages, which 
limited the opportunity for local level participation (CRS 2001:4). 
  In participative processes, the absence of vulnerable groups, the ex-
cluded, the poor is not surprising. The literature shows that poor people tend 
to be poorly organized (Putnam 1993; Inglehart 1997), and they remain rela-
tively voiceless at the local level and quite reluctant to influence processes 
of policy-making affecting broader social groupings. From the perspective 
of the poor, there are several problems with political endeavors: they tend 
not to deliver immediate material gains; they are often dangerous, in that 
they exacerbate the vulnerability of the poor; and they require resources that 
the poor seldom possess. But even when the poor participate, participation 
might actually confirm the clientelist structures in circumstances where the 
poor are highly dependent upon non-poor groups (Vandana 1996; Van der 
Linden 1997). If direct participation is problematic for poor people, other, 
more indirect mechanisms are called for to address the poverty issue (Eng-
berg-Pedersen & Webster 2002:6). Bolivian government chose to voice the 
priorities for poverty reduction through the representative logic, assuming 
that the local political level would be much closer to the citizens than the 
national level, that the local level knows more about poverty and is aware of 
the needs and priorities related to resource allocation to eradicate poverty 
(Painter 2002:7). However, there are two important problems related to this 
line of thinking. Firstly, the literature strongly suggests that Bolivian politics 
is characterized by clientelism and patronage. The local level will most 
probably not escape from these mechanisms16. Some argue that the only 
thing decentralization brought was the decentralization of nepotism and 
corruption (Kaufmann et al.2001:17). So, what are the guarantees that the 
municipal participants in the round tables were genuinely representing the 
needs and priorities related to reducing poverty? In many situations particu-
lar groups are exactly trying to maintain the inequalities and the economic 
exploitation (Engberg-Pedersen & Webster 2002:3). This is not to say that 
there are no reformers among the ‘winners’ in a given system. But to assume 
that significant proposals for genuine reform and change will be forthcom-
ing from an elite that owes its success to the status quo, might be somewhat 
16 Kaufmann et al. (2001:41) 
argue that “major transparency-
related reforms are needed at 
the local level, where substantial 
weaknesses persist, and where 
many municipalities and local 
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naïve. Correction mechanisms are thus justified from a pro-poor point of 
view. Secondly, making abstraction of the clientelist mechanisms, one can-
not assume that the local level is about homogenous communities having 
reached a consensus regarding development priorities. The local level is 
heterogeneous, marked by social stratification and power differences. Local 
political power will thus most probably be yielded in the interest of the more 
powerful and organized groups, i.e. the local mestizo elite rather than in the 
interest of the local indigenous poor (Andersson 1999:6). It is very difficult 
to tune down the vested, powerful and organized interests in favor of the 
unorganized and voiceless poor. A local process, no matter how open, par-
ticipative and democratic in content, does not necessarily produce outcomes 
that are in the best interest of the poor. It may even work to the benefit of the 
poor when top-down non-participative, but pro-poor schemes are simply 
imposed to neutralize all too powerful local brokers and patrons (Vandana 
1996; Van der Linden 1997). In the case of Bolivia, doubts have also been 
expressed regarding the capability of local office holders to correctly assess 
poverty issues and to propose effective and remediating solutions. Witness 
the frequent ‘wish list’ phenomenon, where municipalities ask for things like 
‘repairing the statue of the local saint’ or ‘redecorating the central plaza’ as 
part of their poverty reduction plan (interview McLean). It is therefore in 
some cases wholly justified to rely more on technical expertise and/or actors 
that have specialized knowledge regarding poverty-assessment and are situ-
ated above the local level. Attempts to influence policies and decisions af-
fecting the conditions of the poor are typically, but not exclusively, undertak-
en by various kinds of organization on their behalf. It is assumed that these 
organizations have clearly identified with the interests and concerns of the 
poor in order to act on their behalf. (Engberg-Pedersen & Webster 2002:6). 
When specialized organizations lobby on behalf of the poor, this naturally 
creates problems of representation, first, because the interests and concerns 
of the poor must pass through intermediaries who must identify with their 
interests, and second, because these same intermediaries have their own 
concerns and interests. The pro-poor policies they try to press through are 
thus heavily determined by the pro-poor orientation of the organizational 
landscape (Engberg-Pedersen & Webster 2002:6). From a theoretical and 
pro-poor point of view, it thus seems legitimate to steer and manipulate the 
process in favor of the vulnerable groups and invoke technical expertise and 
the use of tools such as Participatory Poverty Assessment. This however did 
not take place in Bolivia. 
  The involvement of intermediary organizations not only remained 
very limited, but also gave rise to a new cleavage within civil society: 
representativeness versus expertise. This cleavage manifested itself during 
the participation process. Local level elected actors regularly questioned the 
legitimacy and representativeness of large intermediate NGOs: on behalf 
of whom are they claiming access to resources and are they participating in 
decision-making processes? Who has given them a mandate? How many 
people do they represent? The organizations in the Bolivian civil society that 
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and representativeness of intermediate NGOs specialized in advocacy and 
lobbying. The latter organizations do not always have direct relations with 
the local level, yet they try to influence politics and compete for resources 
on behalf of certain groups. This tension between two different organiza-
tional formats surfaced during the Dialogue: representation versus expertise. 
According to elected representatives, one can only meaningfully participate 
when one has a mandate that is supported by voters or members. Legitimacy 
is thus about the numbers one represents, numbers make the claim or inter-
est legitimate. On the other hand, the organizations that are highly special-
ized often draw upon normative or moral grounds for legitimacy: gender, 
human rights, ethnicity, the environment... are in themselves legitimate 
issues, because of the moral weight or the public good aspects these topics 
carry. As the participatory process from the outset focused on representa-
tion, CSOs found their margin of influence much reduced because their 
points of view were attacked as lacking legitimacy. 
   
  By way of conclusion, it seems relevant to place the National Dialogue 
in the wider political landscape and try to assess its importance in com-
parison with other events. Although the launching of the National Dialogue 
was covered by the press and media, it was eclipsed by the conflicts that 
were taking place on the streets. The months before, during and after the 
Dialogue were unusually conflictive and violent ones (interview Carlos Vil-
legas; Hugo Fernandez). Ironically enough, government was sitting around 
the table with ‘civil society’, while at the same time, in the streets, harsh 
confrontations were taking place between armed government forces and a 
wide array of organizations. Due to the social unrests, the closing stages of 
the National Dialogue did not receive much attention in the press. The rela-
tive ‘unimportance’ of the Dialogue is confirmed by a poll held at the time 
in which only 12% of the people interviewed replied they knew of the exist-
ence of the National Dialogue. The people who were aware of the Dialogue 
were mostly individuals with high income (Andersen & Nina 2001: 361). 
Of these ‘informed citizens’ however, not less than 86% of the middle and 
low-income respondents thought that the Dialogue was a political maneuver 
(ibid: 362)17. Clearly, most Bolivians did not know about the National Dia-
logue, and when they knew, they tended not to believe in the sincere motiva-
tions of government. This is another illustration of the deep-seated distrust 
of Bolivians in their government
  We should not forget how dubious and contradictory the position of 
the Bolivian government towards civil society has been. On the one hand, 
participation was granted and stimulated; on the other hand ruthless reac-
tions against civil society protest were not shunned. Clashes between the 
security forces and civil society have been numerous during the last couple 
of years, and they often turned violent. The campaign of the Banzer govern-
ment to eradicate coca production in the Chapare region, as part of its fight 
against drugs, is a case in point. Many of the coca farmers are poor immi-
grants from the Andean highlands and for them the production of coca, a 
traditional crop in Bolivia used for local consumption (the leaves are chewed 
17 The poll only included persons 
from large or organized business 
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or brewed to make a tea) as well as for sale to drug traffickers, is a question 
of survival. Coca production is an important part of the local economy18
(Laserna, 1993). Since the late 1980s a dual track strategy has been fol-
lowed, which combines the introduction of alternative agricultural and 
tree crops with gradually more restrictive legal measures against excessive 
production and drug trafficking. This policy has not met with much success, 
notwithstanding enthusiastic financial support of the donor community. 
Coca is easy to produce and is very profitable. The failure of the alterna-
tive development initiatives was among others due, in the words of one of 
the donors “to the lack of coherence between production and marketing, to 
unstable national and international markets for alternative products, and to 
a general weakening of the national economy” (GTZ, 2001:24). The Banzer 
government, rather than trying to improve on this dual track strategy, decid-
ed to go for a forced eradication campaign, whatever the cost. Whereas an 
alternative strategy requires a relation of trust with the coca farmer organi-
zations and full grassroots participation, the government tipped the balance 
in favor of a military solution. with ruthless repression. If an example has to 
be provided of a policy that has a high probability of proving unsustainable 
in the long run because it does not allow for popular participation, then the 
so-called Dignity Plan is a prime candidate. Remarkably, the same donor 
community that so insisted on a more participative approach, and that con-
gratulated the Banzer government for its National Dialogue, stood by while 
the government sent in the military19.
  Although the government, under the leadership of Vice-President 
(and later President) Jorge Quiroga, seems to have genuinely invested in the 
participatory process, it also kept a tight control on how it evolved and in 
particular made sure that the expression of popular frustration was turned 
away from politically sensitive issues. One of the major causes of the poor 
performance of the Bolivian economy is that the country is bogged down 
by extreme forms of clientelism and patronage in the public sector, and 
by widespread corruption. Efforts to reform the public sector, such as the 
SAFCO Law of 1990 have produced very little results. A study by World 
Bank staff identifies this malfunctioning of the state as the major explana-
tion why Bolivia, notwithstanding its exemplary macroeconomic policies, 
has registered negligible growth in income per capita  (Kaufmann et al. 
2001). The Banzer, and later Quiroga governments that enacted the partici-
patory process, did very little to turn the tide, on the contrary, they profited, 
as did previous governments, of the spoils this political system provided to 
the powers that be. Significantly the government did not seek an alliance 
with civil society to bring the so needed reforms to the functioning of the 
state and the bureaucracy. 
  Donors are aware of the before mentioned problems, but they have 
been more keen to insulate their own aid programs from the disadvantages 
of public sector failings, than to use the conditionality weapon to impose 
more radical reforms. Bolivia counts a small number of highly competent 
and well-trained technocrats who are working in the interface between the 
18 It has been estimated that the 
coca eradication campaign has 
led to a cumulative drop in eco-
nomic output between 1997 and 
2000 of 3% of GDP. In addition, 
for every dollar of direct drop in 
output there was an estimated 
extra dollar drop in related eco-
nomic activity. The direct plus 
indirect effects on employment 
have been estimated at 59,000 
jobs (UDAPE 2001). 
19 In a paper produced by the 
German development co-opera-
tion the following critical com-
ments appeared: “The current 
flash reduction of surplus coca to 
almost zero, without that being 
accompanied by a necessary 
process of alternative develop-
ment, may be equivalent to a 
political time-bomb, especially 
since Bolivia has been undergo-
ing a severe economic and social 
crisis for years. Under these 
circumstances, drug control by 
means of repressive measures 
and military presence might 
seem diametrically opposed to 
the actual principles of alterna-
tive and human development” 
(GTZ 2001, 25). The Americans 
on the other hand warmly ap-
plauded the policy, whereas the 
World Bank declared that it was 
not supporting this part of the 
Government strategy because it 
did not correspond to the Bank’s 
“comparative advantage” (World 
Bank, 2001c:8). The population, 
which was denied participa-
tion, voiced its protest through 
the ballot box: Evo Morales, 
the leader of the coca growers, 
came a resounding second in the 
presidential elections of 2002, 
with just a few percentage points 
less than the  Gonzales Sanchez 
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government and the donor community. They are in senior positions in donor 
funded programs and funds, find a niche in the few non-politicized organi-
zations like the Central Bank, they work as consultants for the government, 
or find a job in some of the intermediary NGOs in positions funded by do-
nors. Some of them go into politics, like Vice-President Jorge Quiroga who 
dealt with the donor community on behalf of President Banzer, or Ronny 
McLean, a former Minister of Finance and Mayor of La Paz who ran an 
unsuccessful campaign for the presidency in the 2002 elections. For succes-
sive governments the reliance on this small class of technocrats has been a 
way of shielding themselves and the donors from the disadvantages of an 
otherwise highly politicized bureaucracy where few people are nominated 
because of their intrinsic competence. However, it is not a solution for the 
problems of ordinary Bolivians who depend on one of the most inept public 
sectors of the continent for many of the services that are essential to their 
well-being. In this sense, the strenuous efforts at civil society participation 
were cleverly manipulated by the government to satisfy the donor commu-
nity while minimizing the effect on the underlying political mechanisms of 
Bolivian politics. It is in this sense that we argue that the sting was taken out 
of the participation process.
  2.4.  Ownership
    Ownership has become a very fashionable concept within de-
velopment practice. Donors for instance insist that receiving countries have 
more “ownership” than in the past over macroeconomic and other reform 
programs. Several conditions must apparently be satisfied before the “own-
ership” label can be awarded. The Government must have the analytical 
capacity to produce a coherent reform program (rather than it being written 
by, say, international consultants or World Bank and IMF staff), the locus of 
initiative must be in the Government (rather than in Washington), key policy 
makers must be intellectually convinced (rather than sign under duress in 
order to get access to much needed donor cash), there must be public support 
form the top political leadership (rather than the President letting Cabinet 
Ministers do all the negotiation, so as to be able to turn his back on the 
agreement once painful policy decisions have to be faced), and there must 
be broad-based stakeholder participation. How broad-based participation 
contributes to ownership has apparently to do with the consensus it is sup-
posed to engender: “The Government, therefore, needs to consult widely and 
build consensus internally – drawing on democratic structures as appropri-
ate – with other parts of society, including civil society, the private sector 
and the country’s external partners. The purpose of such consultation is to 
draw out ideas, knowledge and opinions and to promote consensus on the 
strategy expressed in the long-term, holistic vision” (World Bank 2001a:5). 
It is in practice not easy to judge whether ownership in the above sense has 
been achieved. The President and senior Cabinet Ministers may profess their 
full agreement with the macroeconomic and social policies prescribed by the 
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  In the case of Bolivia, one could argue that there is sufficient evidence 
to answer this question in the positive. In a country that up to the 1970s had 
been one of the most unstable of the continent four consecutive coalition 
governments, all of them democratically elected, and in which all the main 
political parties participated at one time or another, enacted unpopular Bret-
ton Woods policies. This by itself is a remarkable fact. This would not have 
been possible if there had not been a considerable measure of agreement 
among the political elite across the major political parties that those policies 
were in its own interests and that of the country. On the other hand, one can-
not dismiss the important influence of extensive and continuous donor pres-
ence. The widespread perception in Bolivia is that the liberal macro-eco-
nomic policies followed since 1985 were prescribed by the World Bank and 
the IMF. At the same time those policies have been increasingly accepted 
and internalized by an elite that is not only acutely aware of the importance 
of being on good terms with the donors, but has been spoon-fed with the 
same liberal ideas. At any rate, donors are satisfied that the Bolivian govern-
ment owns the macroeconomic reform program20. There is also no doubt 
that Bolivia has the analytical capacity in the top-layer of the technocracy to 
make macroeconomic assessments and to write coherent plans. The Boliv-
ian PRSP is technically of good quality and is home-produced. In addition, 
there has been a considerable dose of civil society participation. However, 
here a problem arises. Broad-based participation does not seem to have 
produced the intended consensus on the strategy. The idea often put forward 
by donors, implicitly and explicitly, is that harmony and consensus will 
result from participation, that synergies between civil society and govern-
ment are created when they enter into a dialogue. As if vertically opposing 
interests do not exist within civil society; as if consensus is something that is 
always achievable. This is not very credible, especially in complex, multi-
ethnic societies with deep inequalities and extreme socio-economic gaps. 
Civil society is diverse, heterogeneous, and contains a wide array of groups 
defending conflicting interest. As discussed before in the paper, the partici-
pation process in Bolivia has brought latent conflicts to the surface and it has 
created new cleavages. Participation thus can and has brought division, disa-
greement, and profound opposition. At the same time, it just as well forged 
new alliances and synergies. In Bolivia, some groups in civil society indeed 
feel ownership over the PRSP, while others cannot but feel alienated and 
excluded. Representatives of Jubilee and the National Consultation lamented 
that they do not find their suggestions in the final draft of the PRSP. Large 
populations furthermore do not seem to agree with the fundamental issues 
of the macro-economic policies. As stated before the underlying macro-
economic policies are heavily criticized by labor unions and quite a lot of 
NGOs. The 2002 elections also show the political support for anti-systemic 
candidates like Evo Morales who completely reject the neo-liberal policies.
  All in all, ownership is a woolly and slippery concept when used in 
the context of PRSP. It is also a typical case of donor-speak. Donors use aid 
as a negotiating weapon to bring recipient governments in line with their 
own evolving views about how the economy should be run and how political 
20 In a 2001 assessment of 46 
countries by the World Bank, 
only Ghana and Mauritania get 
better total scores on ownership 
than Bolivia. See World Bank 
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affairs should be managed. Nevertheless, they like to present it as if the re-
cipient government has had a large say, indeed has invented the new strategy 
all by itself. The concept of ownership serves the purpose of masking rather 
than revealing who is really in charge of the PRSP agenda21. Surely, the real 
ownership of PRSP, as of previous structural adjustment policies, rests with 
the donor community, under the intellectual guidance of the World Bank. 
That the government must internalize those externally imposed reforms is 
beyond dispute. But to call such a process of national appropriation of exter-
nally devised solutions a case of ‘ownership” is just not very convincing. 
  A more interesting question in the case of Bolivia is whether partici-
pation as a policy instrument is owned by Bolivian society and government. 
And the answer is definitely yes. Participation in Bolivia is not new, nor 
is it something the donors recently imposed or forced upon Bolivia. Quite 
the contrary. Well before the participation conditionality related to PRSP, 
Bolivia was experimenting with broad participatory processes. The Law of 
Popular Participation (1994) and the Decentralization Law (1995) represent 
the most remarkable efforts to date to increase participation on Bolivian soil. 
In 1997, the Banzer administration organized the Dialogue 1 in order to find 
a broad consensus around the political agenda that would be implemented 
during his term of office. And in 2000 as a result from the National Dia-
logue 2, the Law of the National Dialogue (“Ley del Dialogo Nacional”) is 
established in order to manage, implement, monitor and evaluate the poverty 
reduction strategy. In this sense, the  participation process as it took place 
within the framework of PRSP is to a considerable extent homegrown and 
endogenous. However, each regime has been creative enough to organize the 
participation in such a way that it would bring out the strong points of the 
own executive, while keeping the margin of change under control. Banzer 
invited mostly labor unions to his Dialogue 1, because they were his major 
civil society allies. His predecessor, the former President Gonzalo Sánchez 
de Lozado -- one of the architects of the Law of Popular Participation -- 
decided to turn the focus toward the decentralized structures. Thus, maybe 
the participation processes are mainly owned by the executive in power at 
the given moment in time when the process is to occur. In this sense, the 
PRSP participation process was definitely owned by the Bolivian govern-
ment. It discussed an organizational format for the participation process with 
the donors, and then stuck to it and implemented it in spite the protests and 
criticisms that were voiced by certain civil society sectors. The participation 
process was all along a government-led process that was inspired by the po-
litical structures in place, selected political officials rather than civil society 
representatives, and followed a political logic of representation which is not 
necessarily the logic by which civil society functions and organizes itself. 
As such, most of the CSO representatives we interviewed did not feel they 
had ownership over the participation process, although the installation of 
the Mechanism of Social Control, as a concrete result of the process was 
well received. They did however feel ownership regarding the participatory 
and consultation processes they conducted alongside or in preparation to the 
Dialogue.  
21 The World Bank labeling 
negotiations with recipient 
countries “policy dialogues”, 
and northern NGOS describ-
ing their funding relationship 
with southern NGOs as being 
based on “equal partnership’’ are 
other instances of this rich but 
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  2.5.  Effectiveness  
    The question addressed under this section can be phrased as 
follows: what would have happened if the donor community had insisted on 
all the ingredients of the new conditionality safe the mandatory participation 
of civil society? Would the PRSP have been less effective? Put more con-
structively, did participation make a positive difference?
  To provide an answer, we must first look at how the PRSP has been 
made up and how strong its claims to effectiveness are. The Bolivian PRSP 
is a combination of a long-term strategy document and a summary public 
sector spending plan. To give a few examples of the former, the causes of ru-
ral and urban poverty are well analyzed, the socio-cultural exclusion of the 
indigenous population (more than half the population) is portrayed, and the 
problem of corruption is squarely addressed. The document sets a number 
of priorities, among them education and health services for the poor, rural 
economic infrastructure, and reform of the public sector. A large number 
of surprisingly detailed targets are put forward. In the area of health, for 
instance, the overall aim is an increase in life expectancy at birth from 62.7 
year in 2000 to 67.1 years in 2010. This is to be achieved through further 
targets such as a specified decrease in child mortality, in turn made possi-
ble by among others a specified increase in the coverage in the treatment of 
child pneumonia. In the next step, a number of activities are broadly identi-
fied, such as total mileage of new rural roads, or number of rural clinics, 
which are necessary to achieve the set targets, although it is a mystery how 
the planners managed to establish such a precise, mathematical relation 
between broadly defined activities and results. Using the unitary costs of the 
public investment plan of 2000, the projected activities are then translated 
into an estimate of the total cost of the PRSP for the period 2001-2006. On 
the basis of macroeconomic projections of the growth rate of the economy 
and its components, the budgetary possibilities of the public sector are then 
estimated. What is not covered by the budget will come from the donors, 
through HIPC debt relief and other aid already pledged, and any financing 
gap that is left will have to be covered by the private sector or by additional 
foreign aid. The Bolivian PRSP does not contain a detailed budget for, say, 
the first three years, in terms of investments projects or programs that have 
already been subject to detailed feasibility studies. This part of the plan is 
to be elaborated later, and in the process, the budget and the targets for the 
PRSP will be revised in consultation with donors and civil society. 
  The PRSP thus makes bold claims, but does not explain precisely 
through which interventions the targets will be met. Lacking the normal 
building blocks of a plan, i.e. projects and programs, it is difficult to judge 
whether the myriad of objectives are realistic. Many commentators from the 
donor community and civil society have for instance questioned whether the 
economic growth projection underlying the PRSP, of 5% to 5.5% a year, are 
realistic, although the experts from the World Bank and the IMF staff think 
it is feasible, if challenging22. This is a sensitive point politically, as lower 
22 Even as it is, the planning 
exercise ends up with a financing 
gap of US$0.9 billion whose 
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growth leads to a more sluggish demand for unskilled labor and lower wag-
es, and depressed sales of agricultural and informal sector output, and thus 
directly affects the poor23. To make matters worse, the government would be 
hampered in its efforts to increase poverty-related public spending, unless it 
were to make sacrifices elsewhere in the budget. To give an example, more 
primary education for the rural and urban underprivileged can be paid out of 
higher tax proceeds from economic growth, or, if that fails, by cutting back 
on subsidies to the state universities. Most observers realize that Bolivia will 
face such stark trade-offs in the implementation of its PRSP, but these are 
generally avoided in the document itself. It frontloads the promises, but is 
short on identifying the political hard choices that will have to be made. This 
is to some extent inevitable given the preliminary nature of the data avail-
able to the authors of the document, but it is also an indication of the clev-
erness of the government of offering the donor community what it wanted 
while shying away from hard commitments. The Joint Staff Assessment by 
the World Bank and the IMF, while being on the whole very positive, makes 
a similar point when it criticizes the PRSP for being “weak on identify-
ing priorities among the long list of actions proposed” and laments that the 
action plan “does not present policy plans for the initial stages of imple-
mentation of the PRSP in the areas of public sector administration and good 
governance, although these areas have been identified as key for the success 
of the strategy” (IMF and IDA 2001:10). 
  Returning to our question, what influence did the participation proc-
ess have on the PRSP? Given the intensive and widely acclaimed participa-
tion of civil society, the somewhat surprising answer is that such influence 
has been relatively mooted. The major input from civil society has come 
through the social forum. Importantly, this led to the earmarking of the 
HIPC II resources for decentralization to the municipalities, with associ-
ated allocation procedures and controls. HIPC II funds, consisting of freed 
budgetary resources the central government no longer has to set aside for 
international debt service payments, amount to US$ 428 million in the 
planning period 2001-2006. This is not a negligible sum of money in a poor 
country like Bolivia, and it will constitute a considerable increase of the 
financial resources to the municipalities, but it also constitutes only 6% of 
total estimated public sector spending on the PRSP during the same period. 
As argued before, by offering civil society a major say in the allocation of 
the HIPC II funds, the government diverted attention away from the impor-
tant strategic choices that are embedded in the rest of the document. Indeed, 
apart from the transfers to the municipalities, most civil society actors we 
spoke to protested that their inputs had not led to any substantive impact 
on the final PRSP document. Official actors did not endorse this view, and 
argued that the participation process had been an important inspiration to 
them, for instance in grasping the prominence to poor farmers of supportive 
measures to increase their productivity. They also correctly pointed out that 
civil society would be involved in the monitoring of the PRSP. Nevertheless, 
they concurred that the major impact of the participation process had been in 
influencing the rules for allocating HIPC II resources. 
23 In their projections the authors 
of the PRSP document use a 
growth-poverty elasticity of 
–0.77 for urban areas and –0.52 
for rural areas. This means 
that an increase of 1% in the 
economic growth rate leads to 
a reduction in the prevalence of 
urban and rural poverty of 0.77% 
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Zooming in on this one area where the influence of civil society is beyond 
controversy, the question whether the increased financial autonomy of the 
municipalities and the rules established for their allocation will lead to better 
outcomes for the poor depends on whether the municipalities will make the 
right spending decisions and propose the right investment projects. That will 
partly depend on their technical capacity, which is rated very low by all ex-
perts, and partly on their willingness to propose projects benefiting the poor. 
The latter is mainly a political issue. Whether the majority of rural poor will 
be able to press their claims through, is highly conjectural, as discussed else-
where in the paper. There are some helpful features, in particular the new 
allocation rule favoring poorer municipalities, and the governments’ promise 
to submit a law to parliament abolishing the monopoly of the political par-
ties in fielding candidates in local elections. Nevertheless, there is no telling 
in advance whether this will bring about increased effectiveness. 
  It could even be claimed that in some respects there has been an 
overdose of participation. There are two reasons for this. First, it might have 
been better for technocrats to consult directly with a representative sample 
of the poor rather than to filter information about the poor from the dis-
course of local elected officials, only a fraction of whom truly represent the 
poor. Somewhat less participation and somewhat more technocratic input 
might have been a good idea. Secondly, it remains to be seen whether spend-
ing by municipalities, even if directed towards such things as the provision 
of health and education services or rural roads and irrigation, will constitute 
sustainable solutions to rural poverty. What is almost completely lacking in 
the PRSP document is an acknowledgement of the importance of efficiency, 
the idea that public investment spending must have an adequate economic 
return, from the point of view of society at large. And efficiency, in the 
Bolivian case, is closely intertwined with geography24. There are enormous 
regional differences in Bolivia in living standards that have to do with 
geography. Many of the rural poor live in harsh conditions on the inhospi-
table, arid high plateau (altiplano) at 3,000 meters or more above sea level. 
Bringing social services to them will certainly relieve poverty in the short 
run, but also slow down migration. Yet many of those communities are just 
not economically viable in the longer run. Spending on rural roads that will 
carry very little traffic is investment with a low rate of return, at the expense 
of high return investment elsewhere with a greater potential of lifting people 
out of poverty. To put it in a different form: by allocating the resources to the 
communities on the basis of present population and level of poverty, the im-
plicit assumption seems to be that the present distribution of the population 
is optimal from an economic perspective. If this is an incorrect assumption, 
as is generally acknowledged, then it would have been better to have substi-
tuted some technocratic analysis for local participation. For once resources 
are decentralized to a given municipality, it becomes difficult to say that it 
cannot use them because there are no viable investment project it can put 
forward25. 
24 Bolivia is a landlocked country 
with difficult terrain and very 
poor infrastructure. Low popula-
tion density (7 people per square 
km) further reduces economic 
opportunities. Bolivia cannot es-
cape its geographical limitations, 
but it can improve long-term 
growth prospects by more careful 
planning of public infrastruc-
ture and by steering the chaotic 
growth of agglomerations in the 
corridor La Paz- Cochabamba 
- Santa Cruz. On the importance 
of geography see Gallup et al. 
(1999).
25 Strictly speaking this is not 
excluded. Investment spending 
will have to be submitted to a 
special Fund (Fondo nacional 
de inversion productiva y social 
or FPS) that will have the 
capacity to submit all propos-
als to a rigorous scrutiny of 
benefits and costs. It is however 
highly unlikely that fully-fledged 
cost-benefit analysis will be 
performed for most projects. This 
is not to suggest that FPS will not 
have the capacity to make such 
analysis. It is rather that there 
will be tremendous political pres-
sure to accept projects for which 
the data are missing, or where 
a low economic profitability is 
overruled in favor of short-term 
social benefits.28 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 • 29
  3.  Conclusion
    PRSP conditionality is rooted in the idea that strong civil socie-
ties will push democratic and development processes forward in a pro-poor 
direction. Participation is thought crucial because it is supposed to increase 
the strength of civil society, enhance political performance and accountabil-
ity, broaden ownership and enhance effectiveness of the poverty reduction 
strategies. 
  Of course donors are right to be worried about the effectiveness of the 
aid they give. They have the right to ask for guarantees, and they are right 
to identify governance, in the political sense of the word, as a major im-
pediment to development26. They are also right that accountability, through 
the ballot box, but also in a myriad of other ways that require a strong civil 
society, is necessary to boost governance. In this sense, they have come a 
long way in their macro-conditionalities: from purely technical-macroeco-
nomic to institutional and political. Civil society participation is undoubt-
edly a good idea, if it comes at the right moment and if administered in the 
right proportions. However, the eagerness with which donors have chosen 
to tackle part of the governance problems through civil society participation 
leaves little or no space for the ideas put forward by scholars like Leftwich 
and Huntington. Leftwich (2000:17) and Huntington (1968) caution about 
strong civil societies. Both seem to agree that the strengthening of political 
institutions and socio-economic restructuring should precede the involve-
ment of civil society groups. Leftwich (2000:163) goes so far as to argue 
that the weakening of civil society, rather than its strengthening, may be the 
necessary condition for the emergence and consolidation of democracy and 
development. The direction of causality between democracy and develop-
ment and the function of civil society in this relationship remain controver-
sial issues in political science, but donors do not have such hesitations. It is 
also not clear how a ‘strong civil society’ in a development context must be 
understood. Are lots of organizations and associations the indicator of strong 
civil societies? But what does this say about society at large? That it is 
organized, active, participative and committed to these civil society organi-
zations and their points of view? The recent boom in organizations and asso-
ciations in third world countries is not unrelated to the international funding 
opportunities the donor community has made available. A lot of civil society 
organizations (especially NGOs) are donor-bred and fed, hence the strength 
of organized civil society may be to some extent artificial and not related to 
what lives amongst the people. As such, civil society organizations might be 
as far away from the people as the political institutions. And to the extent 
that organized civil  society is the emanation of endogenous associational 
forces, civil society may still be part of the problem, rather than the solution. 
Recent literature points to the facts that clientelism and patronage are not 
necessarily confined to the political space. Civil society might well produce 
and reproduce these uncivic mechanisms (Vilas 1996; Howell & Pearce 
2000:77; Woolcock 1998; Putnam 1993). So, although some external support 
(financial, moral, technical assistance, political) to civil society organiza-
26 The concept “governance” is 
rather vague, meaning different 
things to different people. The 
vagueness has the advantage, for 
donors and for recipient coun-
tries, to allow several interpreta-
tions that may suit the different 
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tions by donors is a nice idea, maybe political institutions should be granted 
more, and more direct attention. 
  Bolivia is undoubtedly a good country to experiment with civil 
society participation. There are a lot of civil society organizations, and the 
political system in place is open to voice. Bolivia also suffers from serious 
weaknesses in governance, as indicated by high scores on corruption and 
clientelism, which may well have contributed to Bolivia’s enigmatically poor 
economic performance since 1985. And to be sure, there have been consid-
erable successes in fostering participation and in producing institutional 
outputs. Regarding the participation, there has been a National Dialogue 
that was competently led by a Technical Secretariat. Participants in the 
process managed to influence the PRSP. Parts of civil society have been 
strengthened. Regarding institutional outputs, the PRSP produced the Law 
of National Dialogue and a National Mechanism for Social Control. HIPC 
resources will be allocated to the municipalities and are exclusively destined 
to combat poverty. At the political level there was the decision to break the 
monopoly of political parties to field candidates for election. Without PRSP 
and donor pressure a lot of these outcomes would not have occurred. Never-
theless, the results are much less impressive than the official donor discourse 
would let us believe. 
  The basic aim of listening to the poor was only very partially 
achieved. The government mainly listened to local people, office holders 
through the political institutions of the Law of Popular Participation.
Observers seem to agree that it is very doubtful that the poor were well 
represented in this way. Certain civil society organizations were involved 
and played a role, but they only represented a part of larger civil society, and 
this has alienated some other parts of civil society, like the so-called social 
movements and the indigenous communities. Put more generally, there 
has been inadequate participation by all the relevant stakeholders. Large 
absentees were the poor, civil society organizations out of favor with the 
government, trade unions, women’s groups, but also extremely important 
institutions for democracy, like parliament. At the same time, the impact of 
participation remained limited to social issues. The Bolivian government 
successfully avoided being drawn into discussions about structural reforms, 
macro-economic policies and serious political reforms. The problem of 
limited participation and limited agendas in the PRSP is not confined to the 
Bolivian case alone.  Such problems are recurring in most countries where 
the participation processes are taking place. The World Bank and IMF how-
ever accepted these countries had satisfied the PRSP conditionality, in spite 
of the shortcomings of the participation process. This is partly due to the 
donors hesitating to be too much involved in internal politics, but also due 
to the fact that they have not set out clear criteria to evaluate and distinguish 
good participatory processes from poor participatory processes.
  Outside the PRSP, the Bolivian government was allowed to treat civil 
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harshness and ruthlessness with which government reacted to social pro-
tests. We do not argue that PRSP participation has sparkled the conflicts 
over water and coca, but we find it striking that donors who find participa-
tion so important turned a blind eye to what was happening outside the 
PRSP participation show.  
  Regarding ownership, the reality of Bolivia and elsewhere is that the 
donor community, swayed by the idea that government-ownership of both 
the PRSP and the participation process is utterly important, gives govern-
ments a free hand in setting up a participation format. Bolivian govern-
ment organized the process in such a way that it turned the heat away from 
fundamental political issues and macro-economic frameworks. Government 
ownership therefore impeded ownership in the broadest and most consensu-
al sense of the concept. Broad based ownership over the PRSP has not been 
achieved in Bolivia. The civil society organizations that participated were 
and remain largely opposed to the strategy. In order to ensure the goals of 
broader country ownership and increased government accountability, some 
NGOs suggested the need for clear and strict guidelines or standards for 
participation (Bank-Fund Staff 2002:12). 
  In our view the effectiveness of the PRSP is not warranted. The 
absence of geographical variables in assessing economic sustainability is 
difficult to justify in a country like Bolivia. The government furthermore 
made too optimistic growth projections, and, the PRSP does not set out 
clear priorities. So, when the going gets tough, there is no knowing how the 
government is going to heed its promises. It will have to make hard political 
choices and there is no telling how civil society will react to those choices. 
But much of PRSP was not touched by the participation process. Where it 
did, it is far from sure that effectiveness was enhanced.  The Bolivia case il-
lustrates that participation is not always the preferred solution when it comes 
to matters of poverty. Given the need for pro-poor outcomes it is both neces-
sary and legitimate to steer and manipulate participation to some extent. 
Two important resources legitimize the manipulation of the process in favor 
of the result (which in this case is poverty reduction). The first resource is 
technical and specialized knowledge. The fundamental question is whether 
all actors have the same weight when highly technical matters are being 
discussed? We argue that technical expertise should be used to make sure 
that the voices of the poor can be heard. This can have to go at the expense 
of open participation where the not so poor usually dominate. The second re-
source is moral. Special weight should be given to those issues that may not 
be backed by large groups (like giving voice to minorities or giving special 
consideration to voiceless, unorganized groups like the poor, the indigenous 
sectors, but also environment, gender). The conclusion that follows from 
this line of thought is that those who participate may be different from those 
who are consulted and heard. Different participatory schemes related to the 
different stakeholders should therefore be drawn out beforehand and, for ef-
fectiveness’ sake, in function of the desired outcome. 30 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 • 31
  As the PRSP participation processes may well become the standard 
for most  low-income, aid-dependent countries, it seems important to rec-
ognize that these HIPC countries are very different one from the other. The 
donor community ought to take this diversity into account when promoting 
civil society participation. We suggest that donors must contextualize and 
formulate country-specific goals. The contextualization of country-specific 
goals will help to get a grip on the complex and heterogeneous character of 
civil society and the diverging relations the different groups can have with 
government and with other CSOs. The harmony and synergy model of so-
ciety-government must be abandoned in order to accept and come to terms 
with conflict and diverging interests. The insistence on broad based partici-
pation by ‘all’ listed civil society actors is unrealistic and too demanding, yet 
at the same time this casual listing gives governments too much latitude in 
picking participants much to their convenience. As such, this open listing of 
participants as suggested by the World Bank may even be undesirable. The 
questions that according to Van Rooy (1998:199) have to be answered in a 
country-specific sense are: who matters in social and political change? How 
is power, political and economic, distributed among the governed and the 
governors? What elements are amenable to outside intervention? What inter-
vention is legitimate and to whom? Based on the country-specific answers 
to these questions, adapted participation schemes can be organized, and it 
may become clear which parts of civil society should be strengthened, and 
to what extent participation is needed to achieve the desired outcome. 
Furthermore, the existing relation between government and parts of civil 
society in a given setting should be taken as a reference point, in order to 
project realistic goals that enforce wider and deeper participation. It might 
thus be that government talking with civil society should in some cases be 
treated as an aim to be met as part of the PRSP, rather than as a precondition 
to commencing work on the PRSP (McGee & Norton 2001:25). 
Without a clearly established legal framework in which participation can 
take place, it is likely that false expectations may grow, both on the side of 
government and civil society; hence frustration may mark the process and its 
aftermath. The confusions regarding where the right to intervene, influence 
and dictate begins and where it ends must be cleared out and legally backed 
up so as to protect both government and civil society actors. Drawing actors 
into negotiations without setting out rights and boundaries is bound to lead 
to frustration. Giving the government freedom to pull the strings, participa-
tion risks becoming an instrument to neutralize and control dissident voices, 
without it leading to measures that correct or sanction power abuses. Donors 
should thus pressure for more protection and rule of law, while supporting 
the a-priori outlining of the participatory framework, the division of tasks 
and agreements on how binding the results of a participation process will 
be. Once again, donors should be less demanding, yet at the same time more 
demanding by rendering explicit specific goals for specific countries. 
  All these points point to a dilemma: when should donors take the 
initiative and lead recipient countries, and when should they accept homeg-
rown solutions and follow? As Lancaster (1999:501) points out, this question 32 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 • 33
goes to the heart of the aid relationship, and is not as simple as the concept 
of ownership suggests. The World Bank’s venturing into these new par-
ticipative areas is in a way ironic as it statutes prevent it from entering into 
‘political’ lines of action (Doornbos 2001:98). It is engaging in political con-
ditionality by stealth, obfuscating crucial issues in the process. Its linking of 
democracy and good governance to civil society participation is much more 
complex and contradictory than the participative discourse would suggest. 32 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 • 33
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